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Abstract
A technical artefact is often described in two ways:  by means of a physicalistic model  of its 
structure and dynamics, and by a functional account of the contributions of the components of the 
artefact  to  its  capacities.  These  models  do  not  compete,  as  different  models  of  the  same 
phenomenon in physics usually do; they supplement each other and cohere. Coherence is shown 
to be the result of a mapping of role-contributions on physicalistic relations that is brought about 
by the concept of function. It results a sandwich-like structure of the two models, which can be 
reconstructed as a two-sorted theory element. 
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A technical artefact may be described in physicalistic and in functional terms. The physicalistic 
description accounts for structure and dynamics of the entity, while the functional description is 
based upon a design-and-use-centred view of the artefact. Both descriptions belong to different 
areas of knowledge and the question is how they cohere. Regarding the different descriptions as 
different models of the same entity, this question for coherence becomes a question of theory 
relation, i.e., of the relation between both models. To investigate this relation, I am splitting the 
problem of coherence into two questions. The first one is the question for consistency of the 
models.  Though  small  inconsistencies  would  not  completely  corrupt  coherence,  they  would 
diminish  it  and we  should not  presuppose that  descriptions  of  technical  artefacts  are  usually 
inconsistent. Consistency is reflected in theory structure, so the task is to reconstruct the structure 
of the “sandwich” of a physicalistic and a functional model and look whether it is consistent. 
Consistency alone,  however,  does not  bring about  coherence.  Obviously,  the junction of two 
isolated sets of propositions is consistent, but it would be strange to call this junction, which falls 
in two, coherent. Isolation has to be regarded as a feature that diminishes coherence (BonJour 
1985,  p.  95).  Some  relation  must  hold  between the  elements  of  physicalistic  and  functional 
descriptions that brings coherence about. Laurence BonJour regards mainly inferential relations 
between the elements of a class of propositions as increasing its coherence (op. cit.). According to 
Paul Thagard, among the candidates for such relations are explanatory and deductive relations as 
well as other mappings (e.g., Thagard et al. 2002). So the second task is to inquire into the kind of 
relation that holds between a physicalistic and a functional model and show how this relation 
accounts for the coherence of the description that is made up by a combination of both models.
The required concepts for the reconstruction are introduced in the first section of this paper. The 
second section develops the structure of consistent two-model-descriptions. The third section is 
dedicated  to  the  question  of  coherence  of  physicalistic  and  functional  models.  In  the  fourth 
section,  I  will  demonstrate  the  application of  my  reconstructive  approach  to  the  case  of  the 
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transistor. I will then discuss how this approach deals with the ambiguity of structure-function 
relations, and finally sum up my results.
1. Theory relations and sorts of models
The case of physics
Most  investigations  of  theory  relations  have  concentrated  on  physical  theories.  When  two 
different models are given for the same process, in physics the question is usually: which is the 
better one? “Better”, of course, needed to be qualified and may be relative to some epistemic 
goal.  Even if  there is  no ranking among the models,  they are in most  cases alternatives,  not 
supplements. A description may use one model or the other, but one cannot combine both without 
running into inconsistency. For example, classical and relativistic mechanics cannot be mixed up. 
However, one of the models may be reduced to the other. This means that it is possible either to 
express all that can be said by the reduced model in terms of the reducing one, or at least to map 
all results of one model onto the results of the other. In terms of Scheibe’s synthetic concept of 
reduction (Scheibe 1993, p. 266), we have a  partial reduction in the latter case.1 Nevertheless, 
since such a mapping of results may hold even with inconsistent models, reducibility is not a 
guarantee for the consistency of two theories.
There is a case in physics in which the competition between two models is set aside and instead 
two seemingly incompatible  models  are used in parallel  without  a  reduction relation holding 
between them: the case of the dualism of wave and particle descriptions of elementary particles. 
Neither model is sufficient for the description of all phenomena observed. Therefore both are 
used,  as  a  workaround,  in  parallel.  But  in  this  case,  both  models  have  different  ranges  of 
application, which prevents inconsistency. So this is not a paradigm for cases like those that shall 
now be discussed.
The case of biology and of technology
If we look at biology,  things turn out different.  Here, we have two different sorts of models: 
physicalistic models that describe the physicochemical mechanisms of biological processes and 
functional models that describe the various mechanisms as realizing physiological functions. The 
functional account is normative since it allows for judgments about whether a component of a 
system behaves as it is supposed to do. So function modules are of another sort than physicalistic 
ones.  While  this  characterization  of  the  model  sorts  classifies  models  according  to  the 
involvement of functional terms, I have proposed an independent delineation criterion elsewhere 
(Krohs 2008). 
The case of technology is similar to that of biology. Physicalistic models of technical artefacts, 
i.e., descriptions of the physical processes going on within an artefact, and functional models that 
describe these processes as being implemented to follow a certain goal, complement each other. 
Both descriptions are required and technical artefacts, if described only in terms of their physical 
properties not  also from the functional  perspective, would become mere physical  objects and 
would lose their status as technical entities (Kroes 2002, p. 294).
Since  the  cases  of  modelling  biological  and  technical  systems  both  show  the  duality  of 
physicalistic  and  functional  views,  many  of  the  results  that  were  obtained  in  philosophy of 
biology are also valid for the technological case. This holds in particular for the debate about 
reductionism. There was an extensive discussion of the question whether biology in general can 
be reduced to physics.2 However, up to now all attempts failed and reduction cannot be regarded 
as a general means to eliminate functional talk, one of the main obstacles being the multiple 
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realisability of  functions (Putnam 1967;  Fodor 1974).3 One way to escape from unsuccessful 
reductionism is to regard functions as emergent properties of technical and biological systems and 
base the analysis of functional models on strong concepts of emergence (see, e.g., Beckermann et 
al. 1992). Reference to emergent properties, however, would be a way out only if functionalities 
were adequately conceived as properties. But they are categorically different from properties in 
being  normative:  a  function  may  still  be  correctly  ascribed  even  if  the  function  bearer  is 
dysfunctional and thus unable to perform the function.4 I  therefore treat functionalities not as 
properties but as theoretical terms of the functional models that we use to describe biological 
organisms. Functional models have consequently to be conceived as being of a different sort than 
physicalistic  models.  Biological  theories,  then,  are  composites  of  models  of  both  sorts.  The 
strategy to investigate the interplay of models of different sort is to reconstruct the structure of 
such composite theories (Krohs 2004, chs. 7-8).
It is important to notice that a functional model of a technical artefact is not only an incomplete 
version of a physicalistic one. It makes use of classifications (like: being a signal or a force-
generator) that cannot occur in a physicalistic model but are genuinely technical, i.e., related to 
design, use, or technical function of an artefact. Only the different carriers of a signal can occur in 
the physicalistic model. And only a functional model may be used to refer to malfunction, since 
this requires some kind of norm that discriminates function from malfunction – there is no such 
normativity in a physicalistic model. We have two non-exclusive possibilities by which to model 
these devices: a physicalistic model, and a functional model. Neither of them alone covers all that 
can be known about a technical artefact.
2. Theory structure: Consistency
To  examine  the  coherence  and  consistency  of  mixed  physicalistic/functional  theories,  the 
different  models have to be described uniformly,  i.e.,  they have to be reconstructed to some 
degree. For the present purpose, the structuralist version of model theory as developed by Sneed 
(1971)  and refined by Stegmüller  and co-workers  (Balzer et  al.  1987) seems to  be  the most 
adequate method of reconstruction. It starts from the assumption that the reconstructed models 
are not universally applicable but only locally, in an intended range of applications (which may 
be modified whenever new and adequate applications are found). This spares a lot of  caveats, 
which were needed with a  global  approach like van Fraassen’s  constructive empiricism (van 
Fraassen 1972). So my decision to use structuralism is not based on any special “structuralist 
theory conception” that would claim that some theories have a structuralist structure (Stegmüller 
1986, p. 3). I regard structuralism just as one of several tools to reconstruct theories and theory 
relations, and feel that it is for my purpose the most convenient of the presently available tools.
The approach
I will use a few concepts of structuralism only and will confine myself to introducing only these 
instead of the whole apparatus. Moreover, my version is a simplified version of structuralism.
Talking about models in the sense of structuralism, a second concept of a model has to be used 
that differs from the one used in science and in technology. A model in the structuralist sense is a 
mathematical structure, i.e., a set of objects with relations defined on it. (We can ignore for the 
present purpose that, strictly speaking, we would have to deal not with structures but with classes 
of  isomorphic  structures.)  The  structure  itself,  i.e.,  the  mathematical  model,  is  not  yet  the 
reconstruction of a technical description or of a scientific model, since it does not by itself apply 
to any phenomenon; it is not a model of anything. What is needed in addition is the specification 
of the intended phenomena the mathematical model has to be applied to. Therefore, the model (or 
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class of  models)  in the structuralist  sense  plus a class of  intended applications makes up the 
smallest piece of theory or of description. This piece is called a theory element. A theory element, 
not a model in the mathematical sense, is the structuralist equivalent to a scientific model or to a 
technical description. For example: the mathematics of the Kepler laws defines a structure only. 
To turn this into a model of the dynamic of components of the solar system, we have to add that 
this structure is intended to describe this very dynamic, which is done in the definition of the 
variables. Moreover, we will not reject the Kepler laws just because they fail when applied to 
raindrops or to billiard balls.  Instead, we simply leave these possible applications outside the 
class of intended applications of the laws. Only the model plus the intended applications allow for 
scientific explanation and make up a theory element.
I will refer in my argument to the following constituents of a theory element: a basis O which is 
the set of objects the theory element deals with and a set R of relations defined over O. These two 
classes make up the core of a theory element and define the notions that are available within a 
particular element. O specifies what can be called the ontology of the theory, and R specifies the 
properties of the elements of  O.  In addition, there is the set  I of intended applications of the 
theory core.5 So, a theory element can be characterised as (Balzer et al. 1987):
T = <O, R, I>.
Two-sorted theory elements
A theory element as characterised by  I,  O,  and  R may be the reconstruction of any scientific 
model or technological description, be it of physicalistic or of functional sort. The sort depends 
on the elements of R, which may be physical or functional relations. The crucial question is how 
to represent the interaction of a physicalistic and a functional model. I have introduced the notion 
of a two-sorted theory element to analyse this case (Krohs 2004).
A  two-sorted  theory  element  shall  be  conceived  as  a  theory  element  that  combines  two 
“matching” models of the same phenomenon and has greater explanatory power than either of the 
two  models  standing  alone.  Not  any  arbitrary  pair  of  models  meets  this  requirement.  The 
application of the concept has to be restricted to pairs of models that are (i) of different sort, that 
are (ii) models of the same entity or phenomenon and that (iii) describe the same aspect of this 
entity or phenomenon. I call two models that satisfy these requirements a pair of corresponding 
models. Satisfaction of condition (i) (sort-difference) is given in all cases where a physicalistic 
and  a  functional  model  are  combined.  Condition  (ii)  (identity  of  the  described  entity  or 
phenomenon)  is  satisfied  by  any  pair  of  sort-different  models  that  share  the  same  basis  O. 
However, there will usually be some differences in the bases, with a large intersection. The basis 
of the two-sorted theory element is the union of both bases. The overlap is significant in all cases 
in which it can be assumed that the modellers do regard a physicalistic and a functional model as 
referring to the same entity or phenomenon (e.g., the description of an integrated circuit as a set 
of logic gates and as a collection of semiconductors with certain electrical characteristics that 
bring the logical functions about; the biochemical and the information-transfer model of protein 
biosynthesis). Condition (iii), asking for identity of the aspect described, rules out cases in which 
one aspect of the entity or phenomenon is described in a physicalistic way, and another aspect in 
a functional way. For example, a physicalistic model of the heat production of a radio receiver 
and a functional description of its capacity to receive radio programs should not be regarded as 
being corresponding models because the described aspects are different. Corresponding models, 
in contrast, would be a physicalistic and a functional model of the capacity of the radio receiver 
to receive radio programs,  or,  if  you  like,  a  physicalistic  and a functional  model  of  the heat 
production of a receiver. In terms of structuralism: condition (iii) is met only in such cases in 
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which both corresponding models share the application. We can now give the definition of the 
correspondence relation (corr):
(corr) Two models of different sort correspond iff 
the intersection of the bases of both models is not empty and both are applied to 
the same shared element of the respective classes of intended applications.
A two-sorted theory element then is a pair of corresponding models. In the simplest case, it is 
made up of the shared basis OT2, plus the classes of physicalistic and of functional relations, Rp 
and Rf. This results in a “sandwich-structure” of a two-sorted theory element: Two different slices 
of bread (the two sets of relations) share the butter (the set of objects): 
In  the  general  case,  as  already mentioned,  the  classes  of  objects  of  both  models  differ  but 
intersect. In addition, the class IT2 of intended applications has to be specified. Ip and If may be 
identical. In this case, the class IT2 of intended applications of the two-sorted theory element will 
be the same as for each of the separate models. The general case is that the two models have 
slightly different but overlapping intended applications. So, in general,  IT2 is the intersection of 
the classes Ip and If of the classes of intended applications of the two separate models. According 
to the requirement of (corr), this intersection is never the empty set.
So, the general structure of a two-sorted theory element is:
T2 = <Op ∪ Of, Rp, Rf, Ip ∩ If>,
with indices “p” and “f” for the physicalistic and functional model, respectively.
Let  me  point  out  again that  a two-sorted theory element  requires that  its  models  differ  with 
respect  to  their  sort.  Otherwise  they  would  represent  either  incompatible  or  redundant 
conceptions  of  the  entity in  question.  In  particular,  the  relations  that  belong to  the  different 
models  are  of  different  sort  and  are  not  shared  among  the  models.  This  accounts  for  the 
consistency of the theory element, given that the models are themselves consistent: as long as two 
models  share only objects  and intended applications,  but  not  relations,  no contradictions can 
occur  between them;  their  combination is  consistent.  The set  of  both  models  will  of  course 
contain  any  inconsistency  that  might  occur  within  each  of  the  isolated  models,  but  the 
combination will not give rise to any further inconsistencies. 
functional relations:  {R
f1
, …, R
fo
}
Objects:   {O
1
, …, O
n
}
physicalistic relations: {R
p1
, …, R
pm
}
] functional model
] physicalistic model
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3. Coherence
My account of correspondence reconstructs how a physicalistic and a functional description of a 
technical artefact may be used in parallel without competition. In a two-sorted theory element 
there is, so to say, room for sets of physicalistic relations as well as of functional relations. This 
shows the consistency of two-model descriptions of technical artefacts. However, this is not yet a 
satisfying answer to the question of coherence of physicalistic and functional descriptions. It does 
not spell out the way in which the two models interact.
In the introduction, I have pointed out that this interaction has to be reconstructed in terms of 
formal relations that hold between the elements of a body of knowledge. The body of knowledge 
that  is  in question here is  the technical  description as reconstructed in terms of a two-sorted 
theory element. What we are interested in now are the relations that hold between corresponding 
functional and physicalistic models. These may be of different kind.
First,  there  might  be  classical  inferential  relations,  as  favoured  by  BonJour  as  mediators  of 
coherence (1985).  Due  to  the  multiple  realisability of  functions  and the  heterogeneity of  the 
functions  that  a  function  bearer  may  perform  (see  below,  section  5),  standard  accounts  of 
inference do not seem to be able to explain the coherence of two-sorted theory elements. The 
same  holds  true  for  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  approach  of  Thagard  and  co-workers, 
namely of explanatory and deductive relations (Thagard et al. 2002). Establishing relations of 
such kind would result in establishing a reduction relation between both sorts of models, which 
was shown not to hold in the cases considered here (cf. section I). But Thagard exposes another 
kind of relation that accounts for what he calls coherence by analogy, namely a mapping relation 
that holds between subsets of a body of knowledge (ibid.). I will concentrate on this mapping 
relation, which turns out to be a central mediator of coherence in the present case, without ruling 
out that other relations may hold that further increase coherence of the theory element. 
As I have mentioned in my exposition of the notions of structuralism, the core structure of a 
theory  element  defines  the  notions  and  relations  that  are  available.  But  not  every  (if  any) 
scientific theory or technical description is independent of any other theory.  Concepts that are 
defined in other theories can be incorporated by so called intertheoretical links that hold between 
the two theories (Balzer et al. 1987). Being theoretical terms of other theories, such concepts can 
be applied in a theory element in question according to the rules that are specified within the 
theory they originate in. The links are additional constituents of the core structure of a theory 
element. My claim is that the coherence between a physicalistic and a functional description of a 
technical artefact is brought about by a concept that is defined in a more general theory and 
provided by a link: the concept of function.
The link makes the notion of a function available as provided by a theory of function. Different 
such theories are discussed in the literature,  resulting in different  accounts of  the concept  of 
function. It does not matter for my present purpose which one is preferable, as long as it provides 
criteria for  the functionality of  processes or  structures as described in a physicalistic way.  In 
principle, this might be an etiological account like Millikan’s (1984), based on the causal history 
of an entity, or one based on use plans like that of Houkes and Vermaas (2009). I have proposed 
an alternative explication that avoids shortcomings of other theories. It is based on the role that 
reference to design plays in accounts of the ontogeny or construction of an entity (Krohs 2004, 
chs.  4-5;  Krohs 2009).  “Design”  includes  intentional  and natural  design,  the  latter  being the 
outcome of evolutionary processes.  My approach therefore integrates biological  and technical 
functions. However, I will not enter the discussion about the adequacy of different theories of 
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function here. For the reconstruction of two-sorted theory elements we merely need a workable 
concept of function that ascribes functions to components of technical (and biological) systems. 
Any such concept secures the interaction of physicalistic and functional descriptions.
The role of the theory of function is the following: It provides the notion of function that can be 
applied to the objects Oi and the relations Rj of the physicalistic model. Only if elements of Rp can 
be shown to be functional according to the theory of function used, can it be regarded as justified 
to supplement the physicalistic model with a functional one: the concept of function becomes part 
of  the  physicalistic  model,  but  it  allows  for  the  addition  of  a  functional  one.  The theory of 
function that is applied maps the functional relations Rf onto the physicalistic relations Rp. This, 
obviously, need not be a one-to-one mapping. The structures of both models may differ greatly, 
as long as any relation out of Rf can be mapped onto Rp as a whole set (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Visualisation of a two-sorted theory element. Right side of the figure: The physicalistic model consists of a set  
of objects, O1-O5 (only two of the five objects are labelled in the figure), and a set of two relations, Rp1 (solid lines) and 
Rp2 (dotted line). The functional model of the same aspect of the same entity consists, in this example, of the same  
objects plus an object Of1 that does not occur in the physicalistic model, and of a single relation, Rf (dashed line), that  
requires the  additional object.  The theory of  function that is  applied maps this relation onto the relations of  the  
physicalistic model, as indicated in the left part of the picture. As is the case in the example, this need not be a 1:1  
mapping. 
To sum up,  coherence  of  models  in  a  two-sorted  theory  element  (given  the  identity  of  the 
intended application) is brought about by (i) an – at least partly – shared class of objects and (ii) 
by  the  status  of  some  of  the  physicalistic  relations  that  hold  between  the  objects  as  being 
functional according to a link to the theory of function, therefore by a mapping of the functions to 
physicalistic  relations.  Such  a  mapping  increases  the  coherence  of  a  body of  knowledge  by 
elucidating, in Thagard’s terminology, an analogy between its different subsets.6 However, since 
the mapping imposes relations on the components of the two-sorted theory element, it could in 
principle introduce not only an account of analogy, but also inconsistencies. This possible source 
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of inconsistencies is not covered by the argument about the structural independence of the pair of 
corresponding models (section 2), so it is crucial that it is observed by the theory of function. Not 
giving rise  to  inconsistencies  in  the  mapping  of  functions  to  physicalistic  relations  might  be 
regarded as a criterion that has to be met by any sound theory of function. 
4. Application
I now want to demonstrate the adequacy of my reconstruction using descriptions of the transistor 
as  an  example.  A transistor  is  a  semiconductor  element  that  was  developed as  a  device  for 
amplification of electric current. From the literature, we can reconstruct a physicalistic model that 
describes the structure and electric characteristics of the transistor, and a functional model that 
describes how it works as an amplifier. In the descriptions given in the original U.S. Patents, both 
models are more or less blurred (Shockley 1950; Bardeen and Brattain 1950). For reconstruction, 
I therefore refer to the account of the transistor that Darlington gives on the basis of these first 
patents. In his patent of a transistor pair (Darlington 1953), he gives the following description of 
the structure of the transistor: 
Transistors  comprise,  in  general,  a  body  of  semiconductive  material  and  three 
connections, termed emitter, base and collector, to the body.  ...  Transistors ...  may be 
classified  further  as  to  conductivity  type;  in  an  N-type  junction  transistor,  the 
intermediate zone, i.e., the one with which the emitter and collector zones form junctions, 
is of N-conductivity type (Darlington 1953, p. 1).
His description characterises the class of objects the model deals with: Elements of O are a piece 
of  semiconductive  material  (usually  silicon  or  germanium),  atomic  impurities,  and  three 
connections (made of metal). Free electrons may be added that did not need to be mentioned in 
the description because they are present in the used material anyway. Next, Darlington describes 
the physical relations that hold with respect to these objects:
In the utilization of transistors, a number of what may be considered as circuit parameters 
or  aspects  are  of  prime  moment.  Among  and illustrative  of  such  parameters  are  the 
current multiplication factor, commonly designated alpha, and the emitter and collector 
resistances (ibid.).
According to this description, elements of  R are the mathematical functions stating the current 
multiplication factor, and the emitter and collector resistances. In the structuralist reconstruction, 
the  mentioned  parameters  belong  to  the  class  Rp of  relations  of  the  physicalistic  model.  In 
addition,  so-called  “holes”  or  defect  electrons  as  defined  by  the  model  of  semiconductivity 
(Wilson 1931) will be elements of this class.7 Darlington further characterises the physicalistic 
model by describing how the parameters just mentioned are influenced by structural variations:
[The current multiplication factor] is dependent upon a number of controllable factors, 
such  as  the  width  of  the  intermediate  zone  … .  Similarly,  the  emitter  and  collector 
resistances are amenable to control by design (ibid.).
So, if the required data were provided, the physicalistic model could be stated in a completely 
quantified way.
What about  the functional model? Darlington, like Shockley and Bardeen & Brattain,  speaks 
about amplification of a signal. “Amplification” and “being a signal”, in contrast to the already 
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mentioned physicalistic concepts of a current multiplication factor and of a current, are functional 
classifications of the transistor’s electric characteristics and of the change or time course of an 
electric  current,  respectively.  This  view is  supported by the  fact  that  there  is  not  one single 
correlate to the signal.  It  occurs in various realisations, as it may in general be the case with 
functions.  A voltage change of  different  currents  may be the  very same signal.  Since signal 
processes are functional, we are dealing with an element of the class Rf of functional relations that 
are part of the functional model. 
Since the structure of the transistor as referred to in the functional model does not differ from the 
description given in the physicalistic model, domain  O is identical for both models. (However, 
only two connections instead of three may be required in some other functional descriptions.) The 
“sandwich-structure” of the two-sorted theory element is therefore made up of two classes of 
relations, Rp and Rf, and a common domain O. Both models, the physicalistic and the functional 
one, share the intended application Ii, which is the behaviour of the transistor in an electric circuit 
of a certain type. Therefore, all three requirements for correspondence as posed in section 2 are 
met: sort difference, identity of the described entity, and identity of the modelled aspect. With 
respect to the two models, (corr) holds, and the technical description given in the patents has the 
structure of a two-sorted theory element.
To account for  the coherence of a two-sorted theory element,  we need to have a look at the 
mapping of the relations of both models. Above, I have introduced this mapping as a matter of the 
application of the concept of function. We have seen that the functionalities of amplification and 
of being a signal are mapped on the physicalistic roles of a current multiplication factor and of 
fractions of different currents. We do not rely on any particular explication of the concept of 
function here, so no restriction applies in this regard. It is clear from Darlington’s description that 
such  a  mapping  holds,  mediated  by  a  concept  of  function  that  is  not  further  specified.  So, 
coherence by analogy can in fact be found in the transistor example.
5. Accounting for functional ambiguity
We have not yet addressed the fact that the twinning of functional with physicalistic models may 
be ambiguous. Most technical artefacts can serve different functions, and in general, functions 
can be realised differently. This is known as heterogeneity of functionality and as multiplicity of 
realisation,  respectively  (Carrier  2000).  It  has  to  be  asked  on  the  one  hand,  whether  the 
reconstruction presented can account for both, and on the other hand, whether an account of 
ambiguity brings in any unwanted arbitrariness. Sticking to the example of the transistor, I will 
first have a look at the heterogeneity of its possible functions. Above, I was concerned with the 
functional model of the transistor as used as an amplifier. However, it may be used in different 
ways. Some of these are mentioned in the quoted patents, others not.8 Most prominent might be 
the function of the transistor as a switch. The switch model refers to off- and on-states of the 
transistor. They are characterised by saturation of collector current in the first state, and by zero 
collector-emitter-voltage in the second state. The characteristic of the transistor in the range in 
between,  which is  most  important  for  the  amplifier-model  of  the  transistor,  almost  does  not 
matter  for  the  switch  model.  Nevertheless,  the  physicalistic  model  that  corresponds  to  the 
functional switch-model is the same one that corresponds to the functional amplification model. 
Each pair  of  corresponding models  has a  common intended application (transistor  in  electric 
circuit of a certain type).  So we have two different two-sorted theory elements describing the 
transistor. Functional heterogeneity of technical artefacts (see the two left columns of table 1) can 
easily be accounted for.
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Table 1: Multiplicity and heterogeneity.
Function     Artefact
Amplification Transistor Tube Multiple realisability of  amplification
Switching Transistor Relay Multiple realisability of  switching
Functional heterogeneity of 
transistor use
Multiple realisability of  a function can be accounted for in a similar  way.  Let  us regard the 
function of signal amplification. This function can be realised by a transistor and described by the 
two-sorted theory element already discussed. Alternatively, it may be realised by a vacuum tube, 
which  was  functionally  the  predecessor  of  the  transistor.  Similarly,  there  are  alternative 
realisations of electrical switches. The switching function may be realised, e.g., by a relay instead 
of a transistor (see right column of table 1). Let us regard the two realisations of an amplifying 
element  only,  a  transistor  and  a  tube.  Physically,  they  are  completely  different.  So  the 
physicalistic models are different as well. However, the functional model will differ only with 
respect to the elements of the domain that refer to the physical entity:  to the structure of the 
vacuum tube and of the transistor, respectively. But the two functional models will define almost 
the same functional relations over these domains. So again, we have two different two-sorted 
theory elements,  in this  case describing two different  technical  artefacts  in similar  functional 
contexts. This accounts for multiple realisability of functions.
At first sight, my approach seems to be fairly liberal with respect to the functions that might be 
assigned to an artefact. This might be judged as being problematic. Therefore, I want to add some 
considerations about this issue. I was dealing with descriptions of technical artefacts. Doesn’t this 
mean that I have to accept any function as relevant for a reconstruction in a two-sorted theory 
element that anybody likes to describe, no matter whether it has any relation to the actual or 
intended use of the artefact, the goals that anybody might pursue by using it, or the norms that are 
set on its construction? First, it seems quite clear that functions of technical artefacts are in fact 
context  dependent  in  some  way.  Herbert  Simon  conceives  an  artefact  as  the  interface of  an 
internal structure and a (physical) environment. In his view, exactly this interface position seems 
to bring about the association of a goal with the artefact (Simon 1996, pp. 6-7). Peter Kroes has 
adjusted  this  conception  and  made  clear  that  the  relevant  environment  is  not  the  physical 
environment but human action (Kroes 2002). This results in the view of the dual nature of a 
technical artefact  as embedded in a context of human action. My account seems to go another 
step  further  and  change  the  environment  of  human  action  into  an  environment  of  human 
description.  This,  I  agree,  would  be  a  step  too  far.  However,  the  impression  of  complete 
dependency on the description is false. There are two reasons for my claim. (i) I admit that my 
conception  of  correspondence  allows  for  a  wide  range  of  combinations  of  physicalistic  and 
functional  models.  Nevertheless,  there  is  an  additional  demand  for  coherence:  the  theory of 
function itself has to be applicable in the framework of the physicalistic model. This guarantees 
that not any effect or relation that can be ascribed to a component of a complex entity may be 
considered  in  the  functional  model,  but  only  functional  relations  that  can  be  isolated  from 
physicalistic models.  So the theory of function has to be specific enough to prevent arbitrary 
function  ascriptions.  Reconstruction  of  theory structure  only  has  to  show  that the  theory of 
function is crucial in this respect; it does not have to develop this theory. (ii) The validity of the 
functional part of a two sorted theory element has to be proven by standards as strong as those 
that  are  used  for  the  physicalistic  part.  A  functional  model  that  is  not  in  accordance  with 
observations of the structure, dynamics, and possible use of an artefact is not a good model and 
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must not be regarded as a valid functional description. (Such an evaluation would mostly fall 
within the scope of the special sciences.) But discrimination of good and bad models cannot be a 
matter of reconstruction. Reconstruction deals with theories only and has no grip on the modelled 
phenomena.  Moreover,  it  has  to  be  possible to reconstruct  even implausible  combinations  of 
physicalistic  and  functional  descriptions  for  the  sake  of  analysis.  My claim is  only that  the 
reconstruction method has a grip on “mixed” models, not that it, purely as a method, sorts out the 
best model. 
6. Conclusion
Descriptions of technical artefacts consist of physicalistic and functional elements, which can be 
ascribed to different models. The description as a whole was reconstructed as a two-sorted theory 
element,  which,  in  the  simplest  case,  combines  a  pair  of  corresponding  physicalistic  and 
functional  models  in a sandwich-like structure.  This accounts for  the consistency of a mixed 
physicalistic-functional  description  of  a  technical  artefact.  The  same  theory structure  can  be 
found in mixed physicalistic-functional descriptions in biology. It was shown how the concept of 
function, as provided by an adequate theory of function,  maps the relations of the functional 
model onto relations of the physicalistic one. The mapping relation brings the coherence of a two-
sorted theory element about, in terms of what Thagard has dubbed coherence by analogy.
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Endnotes
1 The case of partial reduction is all but an exception. Even for the mentioned standard example for reduction we 
cannot obtain more than this (Scheibe, op. cit.).
2 For a discussion of reductionism, see, e.g., the contributions in Agazzi (1991), Beckermann et al. (1992), and Van 
Regenmortel and Hull (2002).
3 For a dissenting view, see Sober (1999).
4 The  concept  of  function  has  even  more  normative  aspects  than  the  generally  acknowledged  case  of 
dysfunctionality (Krohs, forthcoming).
5 Specification of some further classes would be required to fully characterise the theory core; only one of them 
needs to be introduced below.
6 In addition, practical inferences may play an important role, as Peter Kroes has recently pointed out (Kroes 2006). 
7 The concepts of Wilson’s model are again provided via a link between his theory and the physicalistic model of 
the transistor that makes use of it.
8 Bardeen and Brattain (1950, p. 1) generously write about “a novel method of and means for translating electrical 
variations for such purposes as amplification, wave generation, and the like.”
